WEBVTT

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operations booking was a Iraqi Army

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brigade , the second Iraqi army

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brigades that operation uh Major

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General and or the brigade commander

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and his staff developed intelligence uh

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for a series of targets uh individuals

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suspected terrorists , insurgents

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throughout the brigades battlespace .

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And uh developed a scheme of maneuver

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uh for his forces to execute a

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basically a combined coordinate search

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operation . Uh asking for some

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assistance from that phone soldiers by

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way of support for some uh perimeter

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security . We call court on uh court on

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security , quick reaction forces ,

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aviation support uh to help facilitate

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the operation really led by Iraqis .

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The intelligence gathered through

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through their sources uh through

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reporting and uh different individuals

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uh to try and gather up a lot of folks

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that have been conducting attacks

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against either coalition or Iraqi

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forces in the past . And so that was

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the genesis of it all . So general more

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came up with a plan . Our military

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transition team

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supported his general . Um Our staff in

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developing a plan . It

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ended up extending over a couple of

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days , probably about 36 hours and

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initiated with uh with some operations ,

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some specific operations in Kirkuk ,

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where no sack soldiers facilitated the

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Kirkuk police uh and the uh have a

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special police unit in Kirkuk that

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actually raided a couple houses for

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some insurgents . And that that

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first evening uh netted

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666 insurgents in Kirkuk and then

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five more in another objective area uh

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northwest of Kirkuk . And then the

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following day basically to battalion

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coordinate search operations

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simultaneously uh in villages northeast

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of Hawija . And in that in that day's

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roll up , we ended up with 41

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additional uh potential insurgents or

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folks related to uh the insurgency ,

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quite a bit of moving pieces with two

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Iraqi battalions and with them of

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course the bulldog soldiers out there ,

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coaching them along , helping

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facilitate command and control . So

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they had uh members of their staff and

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their their mid teens which are the

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transition teams embedded with the

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Iraqi battalion staff as well as at the

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brigade level . Uh Colonel Gray uh took

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his headquarters out forward deployed

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with General Anwar Staff . So we had to

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command and control notes out there um

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controlling the operation . I think

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this uh this operation was a was a key

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step in again , the validation of the

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second brigade and that that unit to

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further themselves and their ability to

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assume control of the battle space . So

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this uh this was a key event for them

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actually . The second brigade size

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operations , tactical operation that

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the second Iraqi brigade has performed

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in the last couple of months and so

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pretty pretty significant impact ,

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really makes great steps and shows that

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they are making a fantastic progress

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and all , you know , all of the Bath

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Stone soldiers helping get them there

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and the leaders helping helping bring

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them to that level is uh is what's

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making it happen . You know , we have

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the support of our cab are 217 camp

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all the time , which really helps us as

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a coalition bring some additional

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effects and enablers that the Iraqis

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just don't have the helicopter support ,

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uh some fire support . We did uh

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artillery battalion from balls of the

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eagle fire illumination in support of

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the operation because we started it

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pretty early in the morning and the

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Iraqis don't have night vision

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capability . Those other ways that we

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help them really , their actions on

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their own were pretty solid and

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definitely good indicators that we're

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making progress . And quite frankly ,

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it's a , you know , it's , it's

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attributed attributable to the efforts

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that our soldiers have been doing and

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just training them at the individual

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level and then at the battalion and

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brigade staff levels to bring them to

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the point where now it's brigade is

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planning its own operation , which ,

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you know , six months ago , we're

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nowhere near that . So it's I think

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it's a very good , very good sign and

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step their

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relationships that are that our

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soldiers and our staffs have

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established with their Iraqi

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counterparts pretty positive . And so

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there's , there's natural , I wouldn't

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pay attention , but I've used the word

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friction because , you know , the Iraqi

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Iraqi units are still still have a ways

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to go . And so there are , there are

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certain things that his second hand to

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our soldiers into our leaders in the

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planning process . For example , that

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is not quite as developed in the Iraqi

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Army , I think Scorpion was a great

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great event , a great indicator for uh

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the work that we've done . I think , as

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a brigade combat team to bring the

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second Iraqi Army brigade along and get

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them ready for us to hand and the

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battle space over to him . So I went

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pretty well .